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Introduction
On the evening of September 26th 1947, Denis Healey, the Labour Partys Inter-
national Secretary, hosted a BBC Home Service radio broadcast. In it, he reflected 
upon the role of the Social Democratic parties in Europe. Democratic Socialism, he 
argued, was above all a “middle of the road doctrine”, it agreed with Conservatives 
on the significance of political democracy, while it feil in with Communists on the 
importance of economic planning. Occupying a mediating position between these 
mutually antagonistic extremes, Social Democratic parties should at all costs avoid 
throwing in their lots with either one of them. Some might insist that Socialists 
should always safeguard the interest of the working-class and cooperate with 
Communists in United fronts. The trouble was that most European Social Demo-
cratic parties had “found that collaboration with the Communists is rather like going 
for a ride on a tiger”, more often than not ending up “with the lady inside and the 
smile on the face of the tiger”.1 Within fifteen months, Healey would be proven right 
by events in Eastern Europe. Across the region, Communist parties had forced their 
Social Democratic coalition partners into a fusion. The last domino feil in December 
1948, when the Polish Socialist Party merged with the Polish Communists. An era 
of limited freedom in Eastern Europe came to an end with this, as Healey remarked 
cynically, “formal act of hara-kiri”.2
This article seeks to explore the relations between the Labour Party and its 
Eastern European fraternal bodies during the first years after the Second World War. 
These parties had been full members of the so-called “informal Socialist Inter-
national” that emerged in 1946.3 Though it is certainly overstating the case to argue,
1 Europe. In: Labour Party Archives [LPA], International Department [LP/ID], Box 13, 
Labour History Archive and Study Centre [LHASC], Manchester.
2 The Fusion of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). In: Ibid.
3 The Socialist International was not re-established until 1951. Before that, international 
Socialist Cooperation was coordinated via the Socialist Information and Liaison Office 
(1946-1947) and the Commission for International Socialist Conferences (1947-1951). - For 
a fine overview of the various difficulties entailed in the reconstruction of the Socialist 
International: Steininger, Rolf: Deutschland und die Sozialistische Internationale nach dem 
Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die deutsche Frage, die Internationale und das Problem der Wieder-
aufnahme der SPD auf den internationalen sozialistischen Konferenzen bis 1951 unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der Labour Party. Darstellung und Dokumentation. Bonn 
1979 (Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, Beiheft 7).
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as the Polish Communists did in late 1946, that Labour was the “cock of the Socialist 
roost” and that the other Social Democratic parties went to Great Britain “for 
instructions”, the British were indeed the leading force in the post-war international 
Socialist movement.4 Its heroic wartime record and its landslide victory at the polls 
in mid-1945 had invested Labour with enormous prestige, not least amongst the 
Eastern European Social Democrats.5 But the fact that the Socialists were governing 
Britain was as much a liability as it was an asset to the international Socialist move-
ment. By its very impartial nature, a Government cannot be seen to discriminate be- 
tween foreign parties in favour of fraternal groupings. As a result, both the Labour 
Party and the Labour Government were often walking a tightrope in their attempts 
to encourage and reinforce the Eastern European Social Democrats.
The purposes of this article are fourfold. In the first place, it aims to shed some 
light upon a largely neglected area of post-war British foreign policy-making. Even 
fairly recent historiographical accounts describe Eastern Europe as a region that had 
been written off to Britain under the notorious “percentages agreement” that Stalin 
and Churchill entered into in October 1944.6 In the second place, it aspires to add 
one further chapter to those narratives which query whether Labour’s foreign poli- 
cy was continuous with that of the pre-war Tory Governments.7 In accordance with 
Contemporary publications, it argues that British post-war international politics 
cannot be understood without an appreciation of its distinct ideological elements.8 
Thirdly, it attempts to illustrate that the interplay between the Labour Party and the 
British Foreign Office was both more intensive and more intricate than has often 
been supposed. As regards the attitudes towards the Eastern European Social 
Democrats, there were no clear fault lines and positions shifted in keeping with 
events.9 In the fourth place, it endeavours to demonstrate that the Eastern European 
Social Democratic parties were nominally independent bodies up to at least late 
1947. These parties have all too frequently been portrayed as “nothing but front
4 Commenting upon these Communist allegations R. B. Kirby, labour attaché at the British 
embassy in Warsaw, wrote: “I suppose it is a little difficult for Communists to understand 
how much argument and difference of opinion there can be amongst Socialists!” LPA, 
LP/ID, Box S, LHASC, Manchester.
5 For example, in his report of the November 1945 congress of the Czechoslovak Social 
Democratic Party (CSSD), Morgan Philips, Secretary General of the Labour Party, noted 
that Labour’s triumph “had certainly given confidence to the leaders and the delegates” of 
the party. After Philips had declared that Labour sought close and friendly relations with 
the Czechoslovak Social Democrats in his address to the congress, he was received with an 
“almost embarrassing reception”. LPA, LP/ID, International Sub-Committee, Minutes & 
Documents 1944-1949, LHASC, Manchester.
6 See: Greenwood, Sean: Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1991. London, Basingstoke 2000, 7.
7 For a contrasting point of view: Saville, John: The Politics of Continuity. British Foreign 
Policy and the Labour Government 1945-46. London 1993.
8 See: Douglas, R.M.: The Labour Party Nationalism and Internationalism 1939-1951. 
A new World Order. London 2004, 1-13.
9 It is in this context that this article will contest the findings in the sole treatise written on 
the relations between Labour and the Eastern European Social Democrats after the Second 
World War: Heumos, Peter: Die britische Labour Party und die sozialistischen Parteien 
Ostmitteleuropas 1944-1948. In: Bohemia 24 (1983) no. 2, 317-334.
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organisations of the Communists”.10 In fact, by early 1947 both Labour Party and 
Labour Government viewed the Social Democrats as the last stronghold against the 
füll communisation of Eastern Europe.
Stocktaking
In the weeks that separated the holding of the July 1945 General Election from the 
calling of its results, Sir Ořme Sargent, Deputy Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, contemplated future British foreign policy in his memorandum 
“Stocktaking after VE-Day”. He pointed to the Soviet Union as the major threat to 
post-war peace. Stalin seemed determined to secure his borders “by creating what 
might be termed an ideological Lebensraum in those countries which he considered 
strategically important”. Britain was to withstand Soviet pressure in the diplomatic 
aréna. This also applied to most of Eastern Europe, where Sargent aspired to hold on 
to British influence by keeping “our foot firmly in Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Austria, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, even though we may háve to abandon perhaps for 
the moment Rumania and Hungary”.* 11 By that time it was still widely believed that 
the General Election would produce a Tory victory, which was expected to páve 
the way for a swift return to traditional British anti-Soviet attitudes. Much to his 
distress, however, Sargent was faced with an incoming Labour Government. Füll of 
gloom, he predicted “a Communist avalanche over Europe, a weak foreign policy, a 
private revolution at home and the reduction of England to a second-class power”.12
These anxieties might well háve been fuelled by signs of increasing radicalism 
amongst the Labour Party’s rank-and-file in the run-up to the General Election. 
During its May 1945 Annual Conference Major Denis Healey, who was on a three- 
month leave from military Service in the Italian peninsula, insisted that Labour ought 
to adopt a foreign policy that was “completely distinct” from that of the Tories. He 
had witnessed Socialist revolution emerging in Continental Europe; it had already 
been “firmly established” in most of Eastern and Southern Europe. The central tenet 
of the Labour Party’s foreign policy should be to bolster nascent Socialist revolu- 
tions across the continent. Most of those who had spent the war in Britain failed to 
grasp just how merciless the struggle for Socialism in Europe had been. It was per- 
fectly understandable that the victors of that struggle were determined to hold on to 
the fruits of their success. Therefore, Healey concluded, “if the Labour Movement 
in Europe finds it necessary to introduce a greater degree of police supervision and 
more immediate and drastic punishment for their opponents than we in this country 
would be prepared to tolerate, we must be prepared to understand their point of
» 13view .
10 Orlow, Dietrich: Common Destiny. A Comparative History of the Dutch, French, and 
German Social Democratic Parties 1945-1969. New York 2000, 141.
11 Quoted in: Deighton, Anne: The Impossible Peace. Britain, the Division of Germany and 
the Origins of the Cold War. Oxford 1990, 26.
12 Quoted in: Morgan, Kenneth: Labour in Power 1945-1951. Oxford 1984, 42.
13 Report of the annual Conference of the Labour Party [LPCR] 44 (1945) 114.
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Over the course of the following months, both Sargent and Healey would come 
to occupy prominent positions in the British foreign political machinery. Sargent 
took over the post of Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in early 1946, 
thus becoming the effective head of the Foreign Office. Roughly at the same time, 
Healey was asked to apply for the vacancy at the top of the Labour Party’s Inter-
national Department, which he was awarded in due course. Formally, the Foreign 
Office and the Labour Party operated at entirely separate levels. The conduct of 
international politics at state level was presided over by the Foreign Office, while the 
Labour Party’s international latitude was strictly confined to the party level. Hence, 
when Healey began his duties as International Secretary, his foremost tasks were to 
rebuild the relationships between Labour and foreign Socialist parties and to assist 
drawing up designs for a future Socialist International. But, as Healey asserted in his 
memoirs, since Socialist parties were coalition partners in almost all post-war 
European Governments, his contacts with Socialists abroad plunged him “into the 
centre of British foreign policy”.14 As a consequence, clear lines of demarcation be-
tween a state and a party sphere in British international politics were often blurred.
Right from the beginning of its tenure, the Labour Government interfered in 
Labour Party affairs where it deemed its interests at stäke. For example, in the 
autumn of 1945, it effectively vetoed a proposed visit of a Labour delegation to 
Bulgaria. In late September, Morgan Philips had informed Secretary of State Ernest 
Bevin that the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) had accepted an invi- 
tation from the governing Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP) to visit the 
country. He requested that the necessary facilities would be put in place. Philips was, 
however, rebuffed by both Bevin and Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton. 
Bevin wrote that there were “certain political difficulties” with regard to Bulgaria 
and maintained that only all-party delegations should visit the country: “otherwise 
I fear chaos will ensue”. He urged that the NEC should henceforth consult with the 
Foreign Office before deciding on foreign invitations so as to avoid embarrassment. 
Dalton was more elaboráte. He argued that the Soviet Union was in complete con- 
trol in Bulgaria, and that no delegation would be able to get a clear view of the polit-
ical Situation. Furthermore, there was no significant Socialist party in this peasant 
country. Above all, Dalton pointed to the great risk that a visiting Labour delegation 
would be “construed as an anti-Soviet move”. Bevin was having a hard enough time 
as it was and it was to be feared that this visit “will be, if not quite useless, positive- 
ly harmful to Anglo-Russian relations”.15
First Encounters
Anglo-Soviet relations also took centre stage when Labour had to decide between 
“Molotov-Socialists” and “Independent Socialists” in Eastern Europe. In Bulgaria, 
Poland and Rumania the Social Democrats had split over the issue of Communist-
14 Healey, Denis: The Time of my Life. London 1989, 74.
15 For the correspondence: LPA, John Stuart Middleton Papers (LP/JSM), Box 3, LHASC, 
Manchester.
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Socialist collaboration. Dissident factions in those parties protesting against the 
police methods ušed by the Communist-dominated populär front Governments had 
broken away from their main bodies and entered into Opposition. It was up to the 
Labour Party to determine which of these groupings to invite to the first full- 
fledged post-war International Socialist Conference that was scheduled for May 1946 
in the seaside resort of Clacton.16 The question of the invitations was discussed by the 
NEC in the spring. While it resolved to invite neither Socialist faction from Bulgaria 
and Rumania, it decided to issue the PPS Government with an invitation barring 
both the Opposition Polish Social Democrats and the London-based exiled PPS from 
the international Socialist movement. It appears that this verdict was predominantly 
influenced by reluctance to put Anglo-Soviet relations on the line. Official support 
for overtly anti-Soviet political currents in Eastern Europe would provoke the 
Soviet Union, with all its dire consequences for the future of Socialism on that side 
of the European divide. As Healey noted after the Clacton Conference, the Social 
Democratic parties in Central and Eastern Europe were “a barometer of relations 
between Britain and the Soviet Union [...], their survival depends wholly on Anglo- 
Soviet friendship”.17
In addition to concerns about repercussions for the bonds between Britain and the 
Soviet Union, prognoses on the political potential of the Opposition Social Demo-
cratic parties in Eastern Europe seem to háve been a major factor in Labour’s de- 
cision to favour their governing counterparts. Whereas all Opposition parties were 
subjected to severe persecution, the governing Social Democrats found themselves in 
a position to exert real influence upon the state machine and to gather a mass fol- 
lowing around them. Reflecting upon Eastern European Socialism in mid-1947, 
Healey maintained that the anti-Communist attitudes of the Opposition Social 
Democrats had left them with no choice but to struggle alongside their “dass ene- 
mies” against the populär front Governments with no chance of success whatsoever. 
On the other hand, the Government Social Democratic parties had followed the 
right tactics. By joining the populär fronts, they had been able to build up a strong 
party Organisation and widespread support amongst the population. This had en- 
abled the governing Social Democrats to “blackmail the Communists into giving 
them a larger share of power” and made them a force “to be reckoned with”.18
In Clacton, the Hungarian, Polish and Rumanian Social Democrats defended the 
Communist-Socialist cooperation and the methods ušed by the populär front 
Governments.19 It was contended that there were anti-democratic majorities in each
16 The first post-war International Socialist Conference had been held in London in March 
1945. It is, however, hardly relevant in the context of this article as “Enemy Alien” Socialists 
from (former) Axis countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary and Rumania) were 
not allowed to the Conference and as most of the Czechoslovakian and Polish delegates did 
not return on the international Socialist platform after 1945.
17 Towards a Socialist International? In: LPA, LP/ID, Box 13, LHASC, Manchester. — For 
a similar line of reasoning: Heumos, Peter: Einleitung. In: Idem (ed.): Europäischer Sozialis-
mus im Kalten Krieg. Briefe und Berichte 1944-1948. Frankfurt a. M. 2004, 13-46, here 30 
(Quellen und Studien zur Sozialgeschichte 20).
18 LPA, LP/ID, Box 4, LITASC, Manchester.
19 In špite of the fact that the NEC had decided not to invite any of the Balkan Socialist
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of these countries and that the populär fronts had to arm themselves against these 
currents. A split between Communists and Socialists would be utilized by the forces 
of Fascism to rebuild dictatorships in Eastern Europe. At the same time the 
Hungarians and Rumanians indicated that they were suspicious of Communist 
objectives, while the Czechoslovakian Social Democrats argued that “democracy 
was preserved” in the first months after the liberation only as a result of the fact that 
they had convinced the Communists to enter a United front. For that reason, the 
Eastern European delegations urged that the contacts between Western European 
and Eastern European Social Democrats would be upheld on the basis of mutual 
understanding. The “dangerous dispute of Western and Eastern Socialism” ought to 
be avoided at all costs, as Polish representative Ludwik Grosfeld insisted. Instead, 
“a bridge of understanding” should be erected across differences of opinion and 
diverging tactics.20
The extern of Communist interference in Continental Social Democratic parties 
witnessed at Clacton alarmed Healey. A week after the Conference, he noted that of 
the nineteen parties represented in Clacton “more than twelve found Communist 
intrigue a major or minor nuisance, while even some of the Parties which collaborate 
on particular issues with the Communists showed the usual psychological effects of 
a shotgun wedding”.21 The forceful merger of Communists and Social Democrats 
in the Soviet Zone of Germany in April had already shattered any illusions about 
Communist intentions in the regions occupied by the Red Army. Therefore, from 
the Clacton Conference onwards, the attitude of the Labour Party towards the 
Eastern European Social Democrats was marked by two central motives. In the first 
place, Labour showed sympathy for the difficulties with which the Eastern 
European Social Democratic parties were faced. It was argued that these parties 
would find themselves in a critical position at least until the tensions between the 
Great Powers abated. Consequently, the relations with the Government Social 
Democratic parties were to be kept intact and the Eastern European Socialists were 
not to be caused embarrassment at home.22 In the second place, Labour tried all in
Parties, a representative of the Government Rumanian Social Democrats showed up in 
Clacton. After an intervention on his behalf by the Czechoslovak delegation, it was re- 
solved to allow him to the Conference. From then on, the populär front Rumanian Social 
Democratic Party would be a full member of the international Socialist movement. See: Mai 
1946. Prag - Bericht über die internationale sozialistische Konferenz in Clacton für den 
Zentralrat der tschechoslowakischen Gewerkschaften. In: Heumos (ed.): Europäischer 
Sozialismus 338-341, here 339 (cf. fn. 17).
20 International Socialist Conference at Clacton May 17th-20th 1946. In: LPA, LP/ID, Box 3, 
LHASC, Manchester.
21 LPA, LP/ID, Box 3, LHASC, Manchester.
22 In the context of the international Socialist movement, this applied above all to the question 
of the Socialist International. In 1946 and 1947 the European Socialists were confronted 
with repeated Belgian and French calls for a rapid reestablishment of the Second Inter-
national. In Clacton, the Eastern European Socialists had already declared that the geo- 
political position of their countries in the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence did not allow 
for membership in a Socialist International that would inevitably be dominated by the West-
ern European parties. Labour took up this argument, contending that the premature con- 
struction of a Socialist International would contribute to block-building in Europe. Some
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its power to encourage the Eastern European Social Democratic parties to sustain 
their organisational independence from the Communists. Over the course of the 
next year and a half it would develop various initiatives to this end.
Intransigence
In order for these policies to be successful, the Labour Party needed Foreign Office 
backing, but such support was not forthcoming in 1946. Instead, the Foreign Office 
seems to have viewed the political Situation in post-war Eastern Europe from 
a black-and-white perspective in which all parties that were not overtly anti- 
Communist were written off as “well sold to the Communists”.23 It comes as no sur- 
prise, then, that the Foreign Office had pinned its hopes upon those Conservative, 
Liberal and Peasant parties that it considered most likely to prove a bulwark against 
Communism in Eastern Europe. For example, in Poland it fostered the Polish 
Peasant Party (PSL) and its leader Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. In November 1945, he 
spoke privately with Bevin in London. Mikolajczyk assured the Foreign Secretary 
that the struggle for democracy was being won in Poland and over the next year the 
Foreign Office attempted to shore up the PSL.24
The fact that a Labour Government was supporting Conservative forces in 
Eastern Europe to the neglect of the Socialist parties caused particular distress both 
at the Labour Party’s headquarters and amongst its rank-and-file. Most often, the 
diplomatic personnel at Britain’s Eastern European embassies was held to be the cul- 
prit. Writing in August 1946, Healey argued that there was “a real danger in accept- 
ing at face value the evidence of ‘converted’ Tories” of the “Quintin Hogg and Bob 
Boothby type” at British embassies. According to Healey, these diplomats were 
more interested “in finding sticks with which to beat the Russians” than in the future 
of the democratic order in Eastern Europe. For that reason too, all Eastern European 
Social Democratic parties were begging the Labour Party “to send out labour 
attachés so that they can have at least one person in each embassy to whom they can 
talk without fear and with some hope of sympathetic understanding”.25
Similarly, at both the 1946 and 1947 Labour Party Conferences, resolutions were 
taken calling upon Bevin to modernise and broaden the Foreign Service. It was
authors claim that this line of reasoning was chiefly intended to conceal the Labour Party’s 
own interest in forestalling the reconstitution of the Socialist International. See: Loth, Wil-
fried: Sozialismus und Internationalismus. Die französischen Sozialisten und die Nach- 
kriegsordnung Europas 1940-1950. Stuttgart 1977, 113-116.
23 Quoted in: Heumos: Die britische Labour Party 319 (cf. fn. 9).
24 Bullock, Alan: Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951. Oxford, New York, London 
1983, 140-141.
25 LPA, LP/ID, Box 4, LHASC, Manchester. Labour attachés were Ministry of Labour offi- 
cials at British embassies. Formally, it was their duty to report back to the Ministry of 
Labour on labour conditions and trade union Organisation. In fact, some got involved in 
political work, as labour attachés were a focal point for left-wing political leaders who had 
beforehand found no contact in British embassy circles. An outstanding example is the 
post-war labour attaché at Britain’s Italian embassy, W. H. Braine, who “found himself 
exerting a political influence at least comparable to that of the Ambassador himself”.
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contended that “the men who were brought up in the old narrow ruling circles of 
Eton and Harrow and Rugby” were incapable of representing a Labour Government 
in the upheaval-ridden countries of Eastern Europe and that labour attachés should 
be appointed to each British embassy.26 In the end, these efforts on the part of the 
Labour Party met with some success. By 1947, there were labour attachés in the 
British embassies in Czechoslovakia and Poland. In the same year, Victor Caven- 
dish-Bentinck, the British Ambassador to Poland, was re-assigned to Brazil, while 
William Houstoun Boswall, the British Ambassador to Bulgaria, had been recalled 
in November 1946. In the latter case, there were widespread rumours that the Labour 
Government had lost confidence in its Bulgarian representative.27
The Eastern European Social Democrats themselves were outraged at the policies 
of the Foreign Office. Corresponding with Healey in late 1946, Nuselovici- 
Moldovanu, the international representative of the (Government) Rumanian Social 
Democratic Party (PSDR), criticized Bevin. If the Socialist Foreign Minister of 
Great Britain sincerely cared about democracy in Rumania, he would have picked 
the PSDR as his “ami naturel”. Instead, he paid lip-service to Rumanian democracy 
only as a pretext to attack the Soviet Union, while official British support was 
bestowed upon Liberal, Peasant and (Opposition) Independent Social Democratic 
Parties. If the Foreign Office persisted in its attitude, “on donnera un bei spectacle 
de la solidaritě internationale des socialistes au monde et il réussira a rendre im- 
possible la formation ďun gouvernement a direction socialiste en Roumanie”. In 
response, Healey indicated that he concurred with Moldovanu’s views and claimed 
to be “in continual argument with the Foreign Office over the question”.28
These arguments would soon také a turn for the better. In a late December letter, 
the International Secretary recommended transferring support to the Rumanian 
Government Social Democrats. It might be “repugnant” to do so, but it was the 
“only policy which will further British interests in Rumania at the present time”. 
Titel Petrescu, the leader of the Opposition Social Democrats, was but an “ineffec- 
tive old man”, whose following consisted for the most part of the intellectual bour- 
geoisie. On the other hand, the Government Social Democratic Party, led by Lotar 
Rädäceanu, had built up a mass following amongst the workers and the peasants. 
While many of the leading characters within the PSDR might indeed be 
“unsavoury”, they were “at least preferable [...] to the Maniu and Brätianu gang”.29 
Shifting support to the Government Social Democrats might enable them “to open 
a door to the West, increase their populär backing, and to wean themselves away
26 LPCR 45 (1946) 152-153. - LPCR 46 (1947) 165-166 (cf. fn. 13).
27 These rumours were denied by Christopher Mayhew, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State, in the House of Commons on November 12th 1946. See: Foreign Office (FO) 371/ 
58538 RI6535, National Archives (NA), London.
28 LPA, LP/ID, Box 4, LHASC, Manchester.
29 Juliu Maniu and Constantin Brätianu were the respective leaders of the Rumanian Peasant 
and Liberal Parties. According to Healey, a “glance at election results before the war, when 
Maniu and Brätianu were able to control the electoral machine, makes our own enthusiasm 
for giving them democratic freedom in Rumania today seem either ingenious or dishonest 
to the average Rumanian workmen”. FO 371767252b R201/201/37, NA, London.
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from the Communists”.30 The advice was communicated to Adrian Holman, the 
British Ambassador in Rumania, who agreed with its general line even though he 
thought that efforts to make the Opposition and Government Social Democrats 
cooperate might be worthwhile. One month later the die had been cast, as the 
Foreign Office had decided “to drop their support of the Maniu, Bratiänu and 
Petrescu Parties and to concentrate on backing the Rädäceanu Socialists”.31 It was to 
prove a herald of a much more extensive modification of Foreign Office attitudes 
towards the Eastern European Social Democrats.
Year of Decisions
In December 1946, Bevin had summoned the heads of his Eastern European 
embassies to London in order to discuss Britain’s future policies in that part of the 
continent. Meetings between high-ranking Foreign Office bureaucrats and the 
Ambassadors to Eastern Europe were held on January 13th, 14th and 17th 1947, 
chaired by Sargent, Bevin and Minister of State Hector McNeil respectively. 
Opening the first meeting, Sargent explained why Bevin had convened these gather- 
ings. The Secretary of State hoped to make up his mind about Eastern Europe in 
view of both the new Situation that had arisen after elections had been held in each 
country and the upcoming Moscow round of the Council of Foreign Ministers. 
Hitherto, Britain’s attitude towards Eastern Europe had been marked first and fore- 
most by an emphasis on the observation of the Yalta provision on organising “free 
and unfettered” elections in the regions occupied by the Red Army. This policy 
had been a mixed success at best: while fair elections had been held in Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia, the Communists had rigged elections in Bulgaria, Poland and 
Rumania. Against this background, Sargent presented the Ambassadors with two 
alternatives. Either the Foreign Office could continue to resist Communist pre- 
dominance in Eastern Europe or it could acquiesce with Communist political suprem- 
acy and resign itself to the further development of cultural and trade relations with 
Eastern Europe.32
On this question, the verdict was unanimously in favour of the former option. It 
was generally agreed that giving up on political pluralism in Eastern Europe would 
do great harm to Britain’s moral Standing across the region. Moreover, it was likely 
to shock the American State Department, which had thus far pursued a policy par-
allel to that of the Foreign Office. Above all, however, it would produce nothing but 
adverse results in the diplomatic arena. The Soviet Union “believed in a foreign 
policy of friction, they would be amazed if we ceased to oppose them in Eastern 
Europe, and, if we were to relax our Opposition, we should expect increased pressure 
from the Russians in Western Europe and the Middle East”. The Soviet Union was 
experiencing major domestic difficulties: industrial output was low and another bad 
harvest was coming up. Therefore, if Britain kept “the ball in the Russian twenty-
30 Ibid.
31 FO 371/67249 R1313/G, NA, London.
32 FO 371/65964 N710, NA, London.
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five”, the Situation in Eastern Europe might well alter in its favour in a couple of 
years. The general objective would be “to hold position against the spread of 
Communism in Order that Western concepts of Social Democracy may, if possible, 
in the course of time be adopted in as many Eastern European countries as possi-
ble”.33
But, so far, the Eastern European Social Democrats had not been great standard- 
bearers of these concepts. It was pointed out during the London meetings that the 
Eastern European Social Democratic parties “had shown themselves weak and flab- 
by in the past and lacking in courage to oppose the Communists”, in effect they had 
been “in the wrong camp”.34 Yet, as Cavendish-Bentinck noted, the virtual destruc- 
tion of the PSL in Poland gave cause to suspect that the Socialists would be next on 
the list. For that reason, he advocated to bestow discreet support upon the PPS. 
While Holman pleaded for a similar line towards the Rumanian Social Democrats, 
some of his colleagues pointed to hopeful “signs of a growing spirit of Socialist in- 
dependence”.35 Where possible, Britain should bolster these tendencies and seek to 
disengage the Eastern European Social Democratic parties from the Communists. 
Greater collaboration between Social Democratic and Peasant parties was also to be 
stimulated. Even the possibility of giving financial assistance to the Eastern Euro-
pean Social Democrats was discussed.
The Labour Party was to fulfil a central role in these attempts to encourage the 
Eastern European Social Democratic parties. According to McNeil, these parties 
had, after a long period of German and Communist domination, lost their “organi- 
sational touch” and were unable to “make independent Opposition effective”. Above 
all, they required “friendly Socialists from abroad to advise them on how their inde- 
pendence could best be asserted”.36 Sargent also feit that the Labour Party should 
step up efforts to “penetrate and collaborate with” its Eastern European fraternal 
bodies. The British Ambassador to Czechoslovakia recommended cultivating the 
right-wing of the CSSD, which stood close to the Labour Party ideologically. 
Finally, Knox Flelm, the head of the British Political Mission in Flungary, hoped that 
visits by responsible Labour MPs would “open the eyes of the Social Democrats to 
the dangers of the course pursued by their present leaders”.37
More extensive contacts between Labour and the Eastern European Social 
Democratic parties were thus much welcomed by the Foreign Office. There were, 
however, certain difficulties encountered in this context. In the first place, the 
Labour rank-and-file was often little acquainted with conditions in Continental 
Europe. Accustomed to a democratic order at home, they found it hard to conceive
33 FO 371/65964 N1246, NA, London. - The view that Britain’s post-war purpose was not 
so much to initiate a Cold War, but to pressure the Soviet Union into making concessions 
has already been advocated with regard to Great Power negotiations on Germany, the 
Mediterranean, the Middle East and Western Europe by: Greenwood: Britain and the Cold 
War 40-42 (cf. fn. 6).
34 FO 371/65964 N710, NA, London.
35 FO 371/65964 N2218, NA, London.
36 Ibid.
37 FO 371/65964 N710, NA, London.
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of such things as open terrorisation or police state methods and were more con- 
cerned about the improvement of the Situation of the working-classes than about the 
defence of personal freedom. Consequently, so as to avoid embarrassment, Labour 
MPs visiting Eastern Europe ought to be selected and briefed carefully.38 In addition 
to that, Bevin was opposed to the dispatching of delegations to Eastern Europe con- 
sisting solely of Labour MPs. Both on financial grounds and in Order to guarantee 
political representativeness, Bevin urged the Ambassadors to make increased use of 
the Inter-Parliamentary Union to send out all-party delegations to Eastern Europe.39 
The Foreign Office also explored further options to facilitate contacts between 
British Socialists and Eastern European Social Democrats, for example through 
exchanges of visits between Co-Operative Movements.
The most ambitious scheme to strengthen the Eastern European Social 
Democratic parties vis-a-vis Communism was submitted by Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary of State Christopher Mayhew. The usual stress on the political virtues of 
Social Democracy against Communism could in his view be linked to potential eco-
nomic benefits. He argued that it made sense “to popularise the idea that the social 
revolutions in Eastern Europe, which in themselves promise better living conditions 
for the masses, are being exploited by Russia for her own selfish economic advan- 
tage”. To accomplish this, the Soviet Union made use of well-known techniques of 
Capitalist colonial exploitation: it blockaded the establishment of close economic 
relations between Eastern Europe and the West and it extracted more wealth from 
the Eastern European countries than it returned. But without its Communist fifth 
column in Eastern Europe frustrating attempts to arrive at more profound forms of 
democracy and to attain higher living Standards for the peasants and the working- 
classes, the Soviet Union would be hard-pressed to implement its exploitative mea- 
sures. So therefore Mayhew hoped to rally the Eastern European masses behind the 
Social Democratic parties by embarking upon a propaganda campaign against this 
“Soviet Colonial System”. Its pivotal assumption was to be that “[o]nly in free Social 
Democratic countries are the workers safeguarded against both Capitalist and 
Communist exploitation”.40
Mayhew’s plan was well received by the Ambassadors and the Foreign Office 
leadership. McNeil argued that the best way to respond to Soviet exploitation was 
for Britain to offer the Eastern European countries trade agreements on a fairer 
basis. It was also decided to popularise the phrase “Soviet Colonial System”: it 
should be introduced in a House of Commons speech, to be carried on in news- 
papers and semi-technical Journals such as The Economist. And although the 
phrase was not to appear in the bulletins of the British embassies in Eastern Europe, 
its personnel should do everything in its power to advance the campaign amongst 
independence-minded Eastern European Social Democrats.41
39 FO 371/65964 N1246, NA, London.
40 FO 371/65964 N4247, NA, London.
41 FO 371/65964 N2218, NA, London.
De Graaf: “The usualpsychological effects of a shotgun wedding 149
Yet, even before the campaign could be launched, Bevin dismissed the entire 
scheme. He indicated that he wanted to postpone any anti-Soviet propaganda cam-
paign in Eastern Europe until it became clear how the Eastern European countries 
would respond to the newly founded Economic Committee for Europe. Foremost 
on the Foreign Ministers mind seems, however, to háve been his anxiety “to avoid 
being always the ‘official Opposition’ in Eastern Europe”.42
Indian Summer
Even so, in their efforts to encourage the Eastern European Social Democrats to 
assert their independence, the Labour Party and the Foreign Office would act in 
concord over the following six months. Promising signs abounded. In Poland, Józef 
Cyrankiewicz, who had replaced the fellow-travelling Edward Osóbka-Morawski 
as leader of the PPS in 1946 and had become Prime Minister after the elections, 
steered an independent course. In April 1947, the Polish Communist Party (PPR) 
approached him with a proposal for the immediate fusion of Socialists and Com- 
munists, to be announced in a dramatic fashion on May lst. Cyrankiewicz refused it 
out of hand, forcing Wladyslaw Gomulka, General Secretary of the PPR, to rewrite 
his May Day message.43 Cyrankiewicz also appears to have positively impressed 
Bevin when the two men met in Warsaw in late April. At the Labour Party 
Conference in May, the Foreign Minister declared that his Office had experienced 
difficulties with the Poles as they had not lived up to the Potsdam agreements. When 
“they had the good sense to select a Social Democratic Prime Minister, the Social 
Democratic Party taking an entirely different view, the Situation was altered”.44 
Notes of optimism sprung even from Rumania. In March, it was reported that ten- 
sions between Social Democrats and Communists were mounting. Rädäceanu led a 
movement to break with the Communist Party and seek rapprochement with the 
Independent Social Democrats.45
But, for the time being, most attention was being paid to the dilemmas facing the 
Hungarian Social Democrats. In a November 1946 visit to the country, Morgan 
Philips had met with the leaders of all Hungarian political parties and concluded that 
Hungary found itself at crossroads. In the free elections of late 1945 the Communists 
had rallied only 17 percent of the electorate behind them, while the Smallholders’ 
Party had secured more than half of the populär vote. From the elections onwards, 
the principál objective of the Communists had been to redress the balance and 
destroy the Smallholders’ by branding them as counter-revolutionaries. The 
Hungarian Social Democratic Party (MSzDP) had struggled alongside the Com-
42 FO 371/65964 N4248, NA, London.
43 FO 371/66093 N6707, NA London.
44 LPCR 46 (1947) 180 (cf. fn. 13). - The Polish Socialists themselves seem to have much wel- 
comed British interest in their cause. After Bevin’s visit to Warsaw, Grosfeld went out of his 
way to thank British diplomats for the “gesture” the Secretary of State had made to 
Cyrankiewicz. British “support would make it easier for them to carry out Socialist revo- 
lution in Poland on Western not totalitarian lines”. FO 371/67185 R12615, NA, London.
45 LPA, LP/ID, Box 9, LHASC, Manchester.
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munists in the so-called Left Wing Bloc. But the Left Wing Bloc was fighting a race 
against time: the Smallholders’ had to be annihilated before the signing of a peace 
treaty would result in the departure of the Red Army. For that reason, Philips 
argued, the January 1947 congress of the MSzDP was “bound to influence decisive- 
ly the outcome of the struggle”. The Hungarian Social Democrats would have to 
choose between persisting in the present course of following the Communists 
“blindly and unreservedly” and embarking upon “a policy aimed at restoring the full 
independence” of the party. In that case, there would be a real “possibility of greater 
collaboration between the Smallholder Centre and the Social-Democratic Party”.46 
In this respect, the Foreign Office was in complete agreement with Philips. The 
British Political Mission in Budapest had already pointed to the appeal of an anti- 
Communist coalition of Social Democrats and Smallholders’.47
At the congress, which was attended by Healey, the issue of Social Democratic- 
Communist Cooperation took centre stage. Similar to their Polish counterparts a few 
months later, the Hungarian Communists had recently suggested a merger. The 
Social Democrats had “so emphatically rejected” this offer “that it has not since been 
heard”. There were, however, certain other problems. Most of all, the MSzDP was 
led by the weak and unreliable pro-Communist Arpád Szakasits. While the Social 
Democrats had “the best masses”, the Communists possessed “the best leaders”. 
Düring the congress, the party leadership made no efforts to approach the Small-
holders’. On the contrary, Károly Peyer, the pre-war leader of the MSzDP, was 
denounced by Szakasits for being friendly to the Smallholders’ Party.48 And the close 
collaboration with the Hungarian Communists was reaffirmed. Yet, recently there 
had been signs not only of growing Social Democratic independence, but also of suc- 
cessful efforts “to hold the Communists back”.49 For that reason, Healey expected 
discord between Social Democrats and Communists to increase over the following 
months. Throughout this crucial period an unremitting British interest in the 
MSzDP was of the utmost importance, as “the Socialist leaders will be influenced by 
their estimate of the help which the Western parties will give them”. The present 
leadership was, however, feeble, and a change of power was to be hoped for. Of the 
prospective leaders in waiting, Minister of Industry Antal Bán seemed “the most 
promising to back”.50
In the case of the Hungarian Social Democrats, backing meant financial support 
above all. As Minister of Industry, Bán had just presented his Three Year Plan for the 
revitalisation of Hungarian agriculture and industry. This plan entailed heavy sacri-
46 Report on the Austrian Socialist Party Congress held in Vienna, 15th to 18th November 
1946 - Morgan Philips. In: LPA, LP/ID, Box 1, LHASC, Manchester.
47 Heumos: Die britische Labour Party 326 (cf. fn. 9).
48 In his diary, Healey criticized Szakasits for these remarks: “He had encouraged the Small-
holders’ right against his own left and damaged SP prestige abroad; he sentimentally han- 
kered after the comfortable opportunism of pre-war and would not face the exigencies of 
power”. See: Pearce, Edward: Denis Healey. A Life in our Times. London 2002, 106.
49 Hungary - The Political Prospect. In: LPA, LP/ID, Box 8, LHASC, Manchester.
50 Notes on visit to Budapest, January 29tll-February 4th. In: LPA, LP/ID, Box 8, LHASC, 
Manchester.
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fices on the part of the workers, as precedence was given to Capital investment and 
agricultural development. These kinds of sacrifices could easily be exploited by 
Communist demagogy. Therefore, to strengthen Báns position and prestige within 
the country and to avoid the Communists taking advantage of working-class disil-
lusionment with the Three Year Plan, Hungary desperately needed foreign credits.51 
On his return from Budapest, Healey immediately got in touch with Dalton to 
arrange for a meeting between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Social 
Democratic Hungarian Under-Secretary of Finance. Düring the first post-war years, 
however, Britain was hardly in a position to prop up foreign economies. As a con- 
sequence, the success of the Three Year Plan depended entirely upon American will- 
ingness to provide the Hungarian Government with another credit.52
At the same time as the Eastern European Social Democratic parties were strug- 
gling to assert their independence at home, they won their greatest victory within the 
framework of the international Socialist movement. At the International Socialist 
Conference in Zürich in June 1947, they succeeded in delaying the re-admission of 
the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) to the European Socialist family with 
another six months. A mixture of domestic, foreign and nationalist arguments had 
pitted the Eastern European Social Democrats against the SPD and its flamboyant 
leader Kurt Schumacher.53 In the face of overwhelming Western European support 
for the German Social Democrats, the Eastern European parties seemed to be out- 
numbered at first hand. But, as it turned out, the Belgian Socialists had been unable 
to mandate their delegation and abstained from voting on the question; as a result, 
the SPD failed to meet the required two-third majority by a single vote. Even though 
the Labour Party had voted in favour of the German Social Democrats, Healey con- 
cluded that the verdict on the SPD was in fact a blessing in disguise. Schumacher 
“returned with the publicly expressed confidence of nine major parties, while the 
Opposition of the East European Parties would certainly not damage his prestige 
inside Germany”. On the other hand, the Eastern European Social Democrats had 
“deprived their local Communists of a valuable propaganda weapon against them, 
a point of some importance in view of the recent intensification of Communist 
pressure and propaganda against right-wing Social Democracy”.54
51 Hungary - The Political Prospect. In: LPA, LP/ID, Box 8, LHASC, Manchester.
52 The United States had already granted the Hungarian Government 15 million dollars, with 
the express objective of giving “solid encouragement to the moderate elements whether 
Smallholder or Social Democrat”. See: FO 371/67170 R2150, NA, London.
53 Steininger emphasizes the first two factors. In his view, the Eastern European Social Demo-
crats had already succumbed to Communist and Soviet pressure and voted against Schu-
macher “nicht weil er ein deutscher, sondern weil er ein antikommunistischer Sozial-
demokrat ist”. Steininger: Deutschland und die Sozialistische Internationale 83 (cf. fn. 3). - 
Conversely, Heumos points to the nationalist motives governing the conduct of the Eastern 
European parties. He argues that such national issues as the dispute over the Oder-Neisse 
border or the question of the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans far outweighed any domes-
tic or foreign shackles as explanation for Eastern European implacability towards the SPD. 
Heumos: Europäischer Sozialismus 40-43 (cf. fn. 17).
54 Notes on the Minutes of the Zürich Conference. In: LPA, LP/ID, Box 13, LHASC, 
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In more than one respect, the first half of 1947 was the Indian Summer of the 
Eastern European Social Democratic parties. The Communists, “dizzy with suc- 
cess” after the effective elimination of most Conservative, Liberal and Peasant par-
ties, experienced major setbacks as the Social Democrats rejected fusion and assert- 
ed their independence. Furthermore, there were Signals that the Social Democratic 
parties were steadily gaining ground amongst the Eastern European populations. In 
June, the British Ambassador in Prague reported that the Social Democratic emanci- 
pation from Communism had “gathered increasing momentům” over the last 
months. He believed that the CSSD was the only party that could successfully strug- 
gle with the Communists for the heart of the working-class. Recent evidence sug- 
gested that the Social Democrats were “on their way towards overhauling their 
rivals”.55 In the same vein, the Hungarian Social Democrats claimed that since the 
November 1945 elections “they had gained whereas the Communists had lost sup-
port among Hungarian industrial workers”. As there was every prospect of these 
developments continuing, the Communists would not be able to govern without the 
MSzDP and the Social Democrats would uphold their independence.56
Hot Summer
Very soon, though, the development of the Eastern European Social Democratic 
parties would come to be overshadowed by mounting tensions in the international 
arena. In late June, Healey observed a “trend towards greater rigidity in East 
Europe”, which might be countered by an international détente.57 The American 
“offensive”, launched with the formulation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, 
seems to háve been perceived by most Eastern European Social Democrats as being 
directed as much against Socialism as against Communism.58 Ever since its procla- 
mation, Social Democrats across the region feared that the United States would 
“pursue a clumsy, heavy-handed and indiscriminate campaign against the new 
regimes in Eastern Europe which will intensify polarisations of opinion in those 
countries and drive the Communists to more and more extreme measures”. Even if 
successful, this campaign could only result in “a counter-revolutionary white terror 
in which the Socialists would go down together with the Communists”.59 The
55 FO 371/65785 N7316, NA, London.
56 FO 371/67170 R2470, NA, London.
57 LPA, LP/ID, Box 6, LHASC, Manchester.
58 In: LPA, LP/ID, International Sub Committee 1944-1949, LHASC, Manchester.
59 LPA, LP/ID, Box 8, LHASC, Manchester. — It is difficult to pass a clear-cut judgement on 
the American State Department’s attitude towards the Eastern European Social Democratic 
parties. On the one hand, as has been attested to above (cf. fn. 52), American loans to 
Eastern European Governments were also intended to encourage independence-minded 
Social Democrats. On the other hand, American diplomatic personnel seem not to have 
held a high regard for most Eastern European Social Democrats, even to the point of ridi- 
culing the Labour Party for cooperating with them. After the International Socialist Con-
ference in Bournemouth of November 1946, an official at the American Embassy in Lon-
don “thought it was amusing that the Socialists here should have any real illusions about 
the affiliations or practical freedom of Socialists from countries behind the iron curtain. 
Their presence merely wrecked the work proceedings from our point of view”. See: FO 
371/56244 N14860, NA, London.
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Eastern European Social Democrats needed reassurance above all. For that reason, 
Healey urged the Foreign Office to make every effort to disprove the impression 
that Labour Britain was but a junior partner in a dollar-imperialistic world offensive. 
Furthermore, he asked Philip Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Air in the Fabour 
Government, to emphasise in his opening address to the Annual Conference that the 
Fabour Party considered “the unity of Eastern and Western Europe to be possible 
and necessary, without entailing any sacrifices of the social gains in Eastern Europe, 
or the adoption of policies which might offend the Soviet Union”.60
Yet, it was unquestionable that the tide was turning in world politics, as Great 
Power Cooperation was giving way to ever-increasing Polarisation. For all its vows 
to continued collaboration between East and West within the international Socialist 
movement, certain developments were beyond the Labour Party’s control. In 
France, the Communists had been ejected from the Government in May. The fact 
that the French Socialists had not followed suit, thereby demolishing United work- 
ing-class ranks in France, caused particular discontent within the PPS. No wonder 
the Polish Socialists are reported to have feit vindicated, when France was subse- 
quently paralysed by a wave of strikes.61 Referring chiefly to the Situation in France, 
Cyrankiewicz declared that the Polish Socialists were “wiser than the West Euro-
pean Socialists by a whole historical period”.62 In October, the PPS announced its 
intention “to produce conditions in which a United Workers’ International could be 
set up, to which both Socialists and Communists belong”; to this end, it would seek 
to cultivate left-wingers in Western European Social Democratic parties over the 
following months.63 In the face of the inexorable rise of US-sponsored right-wing 
parties in Western Europe, the Socialist-Communist United front was presented as 
the stronghold protecting the social revolutions in post-war Eastern Europe. For as 
“long as the international Situation contains the germs of war, Poland and Russia, 
Socialists and Communists in Poland, sink or swim together”. In this manner, the 
Polish Socialists hoped to “survive the Cold War”.64
The idea that the Cold War would be a short-term conflict was still widespread in 
late 1947. In mid-October, Healey predicted it would take between twelve and eigh- 
teen months before Britain could hope for success in it. In the meantime, it was 
imperative that Britain should do everything in its power to prevent the “complete 
[Gleichschaltung” of Eastern Europe to the Soviet model. It seems that Bulgaria and 
Rumania had for the moment been given up on by Healey. On the other hand, he
60 LPA, LP/ID, Box 8, LHASC, Manchester.
61 The argument between the Polish Socialists and their French counterparts would mount 
over the summer. In October, the French Socialists even threatened to reconsider its 
relations to the PPS, if it would not distance itself from the founding manifest of the 
Cominform. See: Misgeld, Klaus: Sozialdemokratie und Außenpolitik in Schweden. Sozia-
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62 Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Polish Socialist Party. In: FO 371/66097 N14846, NA, 
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deemed the future of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland as still undetermined. 
But a Soviet attempt to redirect the foreign trade of these three countries in a way 
that would reduce their Standards of living was to be expected before long. For that 
reason, he pleaded to make “special concessions” to each of them.65 The Hungarians 
were to be supported in their efforts to obtain membership of the United Nations, 
while British influence upon the United States was to be ušed to convince the inter-
national bank to grant Poland a reconstruction loan. The latter undertaking was also 
assumed to “give direct support to the Polish Socialists”.66
By this time, however, the Foreign Office was no longer willing to make conces-
sions to Poland solely in the hope of strengthening the PPS. On July 31st, Sir Donald 
Gainer, the new British Ambassador in Poland, met with Bevin and top Foreign 
Office diplomats to discuss the state of affairs in Poland. It was concluded that the 
Polish Socialists were not offering enough resistance to Communists, and had in 
fact yielded to the further communisation of their country. As a consequence, the 
Foreign Office now regarded the PPS as a “broken reed”.67 Bevin hoped that the 
Catholic Church would be able to counter Communist dominance in Poland, but 
Gainer was rather sceptical on this count as well. Still, Eastern Europe was not yet 
completely given up on. While the Situation in Bulgaria and Rumania was “beyond 
repair”, in Bevin’s view Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were “still in the bal-
ance”. The limited resources that Britain possessed would be focused on these three 
countries.68 Some weeks afterwards, Healey was informed on the Foreign Office’s 
change of heart regarding the Polish Socialists. He is reported to have agreed “that if 
the effect of recent international developments (the Marshall Plan etc.) was in the 
end to perpetuate the division of Europe into two, [...] the Socialist parties in 
Eastern Europe were all doomed”.69
Appeasement
The “hot summer” of 1947 ended with a bang. The founding of the Cominform in 
late September is often pointed to as the impetus for the forced mergers of Com-
munists and Socialists in Eastern Europe. In this view, the Eastern European Social
65 The Labour Party attached great importance to keeping Eastern Europe out of the eco-
nomic sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. Its endeavours to this end went back to late
1946, when Morgan Philips considered offering the Hungarian Social Democrats a “blank 
cheque” to advance the economic integration of the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. At the second Danube Conference of Central and Eastern European Socialist parties, 
which took place in May 1947, Healey witnessed “how jealously” each delegáte “protected 
the right of his country to trade freely with Western Europe”. Even as late as December
1947, the International Secretary urged the upholding of the “economic interdependence 
of the two halves of Europe” in his speech to the congress of the PPS. See: Heumos, Peter: 
Die Konferenzen der sozialistischen Parteien Zentral- und Osteuropas in Prag und Buda-
pest 1946 und 1947. Darstellung und Dokumentation. Stuttgart 1985, 42-43 (Quellen und 
Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa 22). - Talk on British Labour and Europe. In: 
LPA, LP/ID, Box 13, LHASC, Manchester.
66 LPA, LP/ID, Box 9, LHASC, Manchester.
67 FO 371/66094 N9823, NA, London.
68 FO 371/66094 N9082, NA, London.
69 Ibtd.
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Democratic parties lost their independence shortly after the Szklarska Poroba Con-
ference and were forced to undergo extensive purges over the following months.70 
To be sure, a brow-beaten congress of the (Government) Rumanian Social Demo- 
crats would acquiesce with a fusion with the Communist Party within weeks of the 
creation of the Cominform. Yet the fact that a palace revolution propelled Bán to the 
Position of second-in-command within the MSzDP in October cannot be explained 
by this narrative.71 Neither does it elucidate how it was possible that even the long 
forsaken Bulgarian Social Democrats did not embrace the Cominform line of 
denouncing the Labour Party’s leaders as “imperialist lackeys” at their October con-
gress, but instead maintained that British support for American imperialism emanat- 
ed from “the forces of dying English Capitalism [...] headed by Churchill”.72 Above 
all, however, developments in Czechoslovakia and Poland lend credence to the im- 
pression that the CSSD and the PPS had preserved their independence in late 1947.
Diverging appraisals of the events in the summer account for the opposing strate- 
gies chosen by the Czechoslovakian Social Democrats and the Polish Socialists in the 
second half of 1947. In the face of increasing Communist pressure at home and 
mounting tensions between the Great Powers, the CSSD opted for an ever stronger 
pro-Western course, while the PPS decided on an intensification of the politics of 
appeasement. The concept of appeasement was first coined by Healey to describe the 
conduct of the Eastern European Social Democratic parties in mid-1947. The ratio-
nale behind appeasement was that while the Soviet Union was in a position to impose 
Communist dictatorship on the countries in its sphere of influence, it would, in view 
of the diversion of energies and resources the upholding of such dictatorships would 
require, be loathe to do so as long as populär front coalitions, leaning on a modicum 
of populär support, would be prepared to meet its strategie and economic demands. 
Therefore, until tensions in the international arena abated, the Eastern European 
Social Democrats had no choice but to yield to most Communist demands if they 
wished to keep their organisational independence intact. The time thus bought was 
to be used to consolidate an autonomous party apparatus and to strengthen the 
bonds with the Western European Social Democratic parties.73 Britain could con- 
tribute to the success of the politics of appeasement if it kept “the political temper- 
ature low” and refrained from encouraging the Eastern European Social Democrats 
“into policies which can only expose them to Communist attacks, against which we 
are powerless to protéct them”.74
70 See: Steininger: Deutschland und die Sozialistische Internationale 90 (cf. fn. 3). - Loth, 
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Still, by the summer of 1947, the CSSD was about to abandon the politics of 
appeasement, realising it had “more to gain by challenging than by lining up behind 
the Communists”.75 Reasons peculiar to the Situation in post-war Czechoslovakia 
underlay this volte-face. In the first place, the disappointing results at the polls in 
mid-1946, where the Social Democrats returned only 14 percent of the populär vote, 
gave cause to qualms over strategies pursued thus far. In the second place, the mere 
presence of other independent non-Communist parties in the Czechoslovakian 
National Front Government, presented the CSSD with an alternative to close col- 
laboration with the Communists that was simply unavailable to the other Eastern 
European Social Democratic parties. Thirdly, Stalins effective veto on Czecho-
slovakian participation in the Marshall Plan, designating that the country found itself 
in the Soviet sphere of influence after all, deepened pre-existing pro-Western Senti-
ments within Social Democratic ranks.76
The turnaround in the CSSD’s attitude towards Communism met with approval 
in British circles. In mid-July, Healey noted that Zdeněk Fierlinger and Bohumil 
Laušman, two of the most prominent leaders of the party, had “flirted too dosely 
with the Communists” and caused the bad Social Democratic turn-out at the elec- 
tions. At present, however, the Social Democrats were “much more independent” 
and were expected to regain some of the lost ground in the new elections that were 
scheduled for the Spring of 1948.77 In the same vein, the Foreign Office considered 
it “most encouraging that two weathercocks like Fierlinger and Lau[š]man should 
have decided that they can profitably adopt Western ideas and align their party 
against Communism”.78 Over the following months, the CSSD would substitute the 
radicalism of the immediate post-war period for a more moderate line. In late 
August, the Social Democrats voted, with the other non-Communist National Front 
parties, against the Communist proposal on a “millionaires’ tax”, inflicting upon the 
Communists their first defeat in the Czechoslovakian Cabinet since the end of the 
war.79 In September, though, a crisis erupted within the CSSD, after Fierlinger, with- 
out Consulting the party leadership, had signed a “pact of unity” with the Com-
munists. The stage seemed to be set for united front Communist-Social Democratic 
collaboration after the Polish model, but the pact was engulfed by a wave of indig- 
nation amongst both the party leadership and its rank-and-file and was repudiated
75 FO 371/65785 N7316, NA, London.
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in due course. It was in this atmosphere that the congress of the CSSD assembled in 
Brno in mid-November. Fierlinger, exposed as fellow-traveller, was replaced by 
Laušman as General Secretary of the party. For his part, Laušman would be kept in 
check by an Executive Committee dominated by “autonomists”.80 According to 
Healey, the congress was a major setback to the Czechoslovakian Communists, who 
were now “faced with an almost impossible task” to obtain their proclaimed objec- 
tive of 51 percent of the populär vote in the next elections “without open terrorisa- 
tion”.81
Optimism at the results of the congress prevailed both at the Foreign Office and 
within the Labour Party. In the first place, the construction of an exclusive 
Communist-Social Democratic alliance had been avoided. The Social Democrats 
were now “tied firmly to the policy of the National Front of all parties rather than 
of collaborating with the Communists in a workers’ bloc”.82 Even though British 
attempts to bring about closer relations between the CSSD and the National 
Socialists backfired in the face of mutual distrust, the “pluck and resolution” shown 
by the Social Democrats had doně much to encourage the other non-Communist 
parties.83 In the second place, most observers had been struck by the enormous 
reverberation of the concepts of democracy and independence amongst the Social 
Democratic rank-and-file. Even the pro-Communists justified their policies “on 
grounds of expediency or necessity, while accepting the same principle as the anti- 
Communist wing”.84 One delegáte was even “warmly applauded” for a speech in 
which “he went so far as to offer a defence of American foreign policy” - remark- 
able stuff indeed, in late 1947 Eastern Europe.
At the same time as the Czechoslovakian Social Democrats gravitated more and 
more towards the West, the Polish Socialists stepped up their efforts to placaté the 
Communists at home. The foundation of the Cominform seems to have caused par- 
ticular alarm within the PPS. Within days of its creation, Cyrankiewicz approached 
the CSSD with a plan to sever relations to the Western European Social Democrats 
and to establish an international Organisation of Eastern European Social Demo-
cratic parties. The Czechoslovakian Social Democrats turned down the Suggestion,
80 LPA, LP/ID, Box 6, LHASC, Manchester.
81 FO 371/65802 N13414, NA, London.
82 LPA, LP/ID, Box 6, LHASC, Manchester.
83 FO 371/65787 N13486, NA, London. - On the endeavours to bring about an alliance 
between the Social Democrats and the National Socialists: Heumos, Peter: Die Sozial-
demokratie in Ostmitteleuropa 1945-1948. Zum gesellschaftlichen Potential des Demo-
kratischen Sozialismus in Polen, der Tschechoslowakei und Ungarn. In: Lemberg, Hans 
(ed.): Sowjetisches Modell und nationale Prägung. Kontinuität und Wandel in Ostmittel-
europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Marburg a. d. Lahn 1991, 51-70, here 69 (Historische 
und landeskundliche Ostmitteleuropastudien 7).
84 FO 371/65802 N13414, NA, London. - In a newspaper article published on the eve of the 
congress, Fierlinger, though perhaps in an attempt to perform some damage control, assert- 
ed that the CSSD “would not allow itself to be upset by attacks from outside”. Further- 
more, he “advocated co-operation with western Socialists and declared himself opposed to 
the creation of a Socialist International, as well as to the new ‘Cominform’”. FO 371/65787 
N13486, NA, London.
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declaring that they were unwilling to denounce their Western European counter- 
parts as traitors or imperialists.85 Thus rebuffed, the Polish Socialists accelerated 
their campaign to further the formation of a Socialist-Communist United front on 
the international level. In the following months, the PPS would publish its contacts 
with the Italian Socialists, who were in a long-term United front with the Com- 
munists, and Konni Zilliacus, the most outspoken advocate of collaboration with 
Communism within the Labour Party. In Healey’s view, though, the publication of 
these dealings was chiefly intended to “delude” the Polish Communists.86 In order 
to ward off Communist assaults upon their independence, the Polish Socialists had 
little choice but to present themselves “as the champions of the United front in the 
international Socialist movement”.87
Even so, a new Communist demand for fusion would not be long in coming. On 
the first day of the December congress of the PPS in Wroclaw, Gomulka reminded 
those present that the Communist-Socialist pact entered into in late 1946 foresaw 
the eventual merger of the two parties. He was, however, counteracted by 
Cyrankiewicz, who, while singing the praises of the United front, declared “that the 
PPS considered it had a unique and indispensable function to perform in the devel-
opment of the Polish State”. This was taken by the delegates as a clear rejection of 
Gomulka’s plea. After having been cheered to “for several minutes”, Cyrankiewicz 
went on avowing “that the PPS did not propose to be a moon to somebody else’s 
sun”.88 The outcome of the congress heartened Healey; it had gone “a good deal fur-
ther in affirming the independence of the Polish Socialist Party” than he had expect- 
ed beforehand.89 The politics of appeasement was doing its work. The Polish Social-
ists would go to great lengths to preserve their distinctive character and “put up 
with much so long as essentials remained intact”. The British Ambassador in 
Warsaw was, however, doubtful about the merits of appeasement. He asked what 
positive results the politics of appeasement were to produce, short of encouraging 
“the Communists to turn the screw still tighter”. These “drawbacks” to appease-
ment were acknowledged by Healey, arguing that the Socialist leaders were alert to 
the risks entailed in their policies. Yet, for the time being, it was “a question of sur- 
vival”. Above all, the Polish Socialists “hoped to gain time to consolidate their party
85 Heumos: Die Konferenzen 40-41 (cf. fn. 65).
86 LPA, LP/ID, Box 9, LHASC, Manchester. - Healey may well háve been right. During their 
visit to Rome, the Polish Socialists were reported to háve surprised their Italian hosts, in- 
sisting “on the need for unity between the Right Wing and the Left Wing Socialists and by 
their open Statements to the effect that they do not believe that the violent attacks against 
Right Wing Socialists serve any useful purpose”. FO 371/66250 N14131, NA, London.
87 LPA, LP/ID, Box 9, LHASC, Manchester.
88 Report on the 27“ Congress of the Polish Socialist Party in Wroclaw, December 14-16, 
1947 (cf. fn. 58).
89 LPA, LP/ID, Box 9, LHASC, Manchester. - In addition to Cyrankiewicz’s speech, 
Boleslaw Drobner, deputy chairman of the Central Committee of the PPS, stated that 
“whereas the ‘stooge’ Democratic Party was a serf, the Socialists wished to be free and 
warned M. Gomulka that any purge of the Socialist Party must be effected by the Socialists 
themselves”. Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Polish Socialist Party. In: FO 371/66097 
N14846, NA, London.
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and its relations with their co-religionists in other countries pending the final out- 
come of the ‘colď war now being waged”.90
Meanwhile, there was little Britain could do but wait and see. Still, on his return 
from Poland, Healey urged Bevin to adopt another viewpoint in the question of the 
Oder-Neiße border. Whilst in Wroclaw, he had been “very strongly impressed by 
the damage which our equivocal attitude on Poland’s Western frontier is causing to 
pro-British sentiment”. He predicted that, once the final peace settlement was 
signed, the new Polish borders would remain unchanged. But, not living up to its 
wartime promise to support Polish claims in the West, Britain was “antagonising the 
whole of Polish public opinion”.91 This was likely to have direct repercussions for 
the Standing of the Polish Socialists at home, as populär outlook in post-war Europe 
seems to have identified the Socialist/Social Democratic parties in their domestic 
contexts with the exploits of the Labour Government in the international field.92 
Düring their April conversation, Cyrankiewicz had warned Bevin of the danger 
“should the port of Stettin be turned into a second Danzig, [...] becoming the cen-
tre of a German irredentist movement”. In his view, “it would contribute to the 
peace of Europe if Poland received support from more than one Power”.93 Even 
though Soviet support for the Oder-Neisse frontier guaranteed de facto Polish pos- 
session of the Western territories, the Poles were desperate to have their new borders 
recognised by the Western Powers, as it was feared that a possible division of 
Germany might lead the Soviet Union to re-annex Silesia to its part of the truncated 
German state. This accounts for the panic caused by the failure of the London round 
of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which had been expected to settle the question 
once and for all. At the Wroclaw congress, Cyrankiewicz even spoke of a “new 
Munich”.94
With the breaking-up of the Foreign Ministers in London the perspectives of the 
Eastern European Social Democrats faded. Nonetheless, in late January 1948, 
Healey was still hopeful about the prospects of the Central Eastern European Social 
Democratic parties. The PPS had “[bjought survival” and was “[w]ell led by 
Cyrankiewicz”; a fusion had been postponed. The CSSD had embarked upon the 
right course at its mid-November congress, although it still refused “to break [the] 
National Front”. The MSzDP stood “at crossroad[s]”: infighting between the left-
90 Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Polish Socialist Party. In: FO 371/66097 N14846, NA, 
London.
91 LPA, LP/ID, Box 9, LHASC, Manchester.
92 In this context, it was established for the Italian political scene in mid-1946 that all parties 
were “regarded [...] if not as the instrument, so at least as the ‘protégé’ 0f one of the big 
foreign powers: the Communists as the Champions of the Soviet Union, Christian- 
Democrats as the Champions of the Vatican, of the North- and South-American Catholics 
and of the French M.R.P., the Liberais as the champions of the State Department [...], and 
the Socialists, quite naturally, as the champions of the British Labour Party and govern- 
ment”. Notes on the Situation in Italy. In: LPA, LP/ID, Box 3 LHASC, Manchester.
93 FO 800/490 Pol/47/4, NA London.
94 Het XXVIIe Congres van de Poolse Socialistische Partij (P.P.S.) Wroclaw (Breslau), 14-18 
december 1947. [The XXVIIth congress of the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.) Wroclaw 
(Breslau), 14th to 18'*1 December 1947]. In: Archief PvdA, IISH, Amsterdam.
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wing and the right-wing was proceeding, with a fusion looming in the background.95 
Yet, when the Communists resorted to “open terrorisation” in Czechoslovakia after 
all, the bonds with the Eastern European Social Democratic parties were severed. It 
is most telling that in mid-March, just a couple of weeks after the Prague coup, Denis 
Healey and Morgan Philips took a plane to Rome to talk some sense to the leaders 
of the Italian Socialist Party, who had condoned the Communist take-over in 
Czechoslovakia and sent a letter of good wishes to Fierlinger.96 The focus had shift- 
ed from upholding the Social Democratic parties in Eastern Europe to saving the 
Social Democratic parties in Western Europe. The Cold War had begun in earnest.
Conclusion
With it came the severe denunciations of Communism. Writing to his Ambassador in 
Prague in Apríl 1948, Bevin apologised for any personal disgust or distress experi- 
enced at the events in Czechoslovakia. Yet, as he pointed out, there was a great moral 
lesson entailed in the entire episode: “Living through a Communist revolution, as 
you did, is unequalled as an education in the utter ruthlessness and perfidy of 
Communism, which is difficult, if not impossible to grasp fully until one has seen it 
at work”.97 With it, too, came the grotesque over-simplifications of the entire 
post-war era in Eastern Europe, which was depicted as a giant run-up to the violent 
overthrows of 1948, leaving little, if any, room for alternating perspectives. Even 
some of the actors that had been involved in the populär front Governments seem 
to háve suffered from historical amnesia whilst composing their accounts of the 
period.98
What were Labour Britain’s objectives in post-war Eastern Europe? At any rate, 
it must be established that the Foreign Office had not renounced its claims to 
influence in Eastern Europe before the Labour Government took office. In fact, it 
attempted to keep Eastern Europe out of the sphere of influence of the Soviet EJnion 
Wholesale right up to 1948. In these endeavours, the Foreign Office felt, rather by 
default, forced to support the Eastern European Social Democratic parties from latě 
1946 onwards. For that reason, the Labour Party was urged to increase its efforts to 
stimulate the Eastern European Social Democrats to assert their independence. Next 
to that, the Labour Party developed initiatives of its own to reinforce its Eastern
95 European Socialism. In: LPA, LP/ID, Box 13, LHASC, Manchester. — This memorandum 
calls into question the Suggestion, implied in the work of some authors, that the Labour 
Party, from latě 1947 onwards, steered towards a split with the Eastern European Social 
Democrats. See: Steininger: Deutschland und die Sozialistische Internationale 91 (cf. fn. 3). 
- Misgeld: Sozialdemokratie und Außenpolitik 122 (cf. fn. 61).
96 The Labour Party and Italy. In: LPA, LP/ID, Box 13, LHASC, Manchester.
97 FO 800/450 G/48/26, NA, London.
98 See: Healey, Denis (ed.): The Curtain Falls. The Story of the Socialists in Eastern Europe. 
London 1951. - This volume contains articles from such exiled Eastern European Social 
Democrats as Antal Bán and Václav Majer, the former leader of the right-wing of the CSSD. 
While these essays dwell extensively upon Communist brutality and the undermining activ- 
ities of inner-party traitors, very little regard is given to the question to what extent the 
Eastern European Social Democrats were implicated in their own demise.
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European sister parties, for which it needed Foreign Office backing. Two varieties of 
encouragement of the Eastern European Social Democrats can be discerned.
In the first place, the Eastern European Social Democratic parties were to be given 
moral encouragement. This kind of encouragement was chiefly intended to wean 
these parties from their Communist allegiance. On the one hand, the Eastern 
European Social Democrats were stimulated to enter into alliances with other non- 
Communist parties. On the other hand, the Eastern European Social Democrats 
were reassured that Britain was by no means bent on endangering the post-war 
social revolutions in their countries. On the need to disengage the Eastern European 
Social Democratic parties from their Communist coalition partners, Foreign Office 
and Labour Party were of one mind. No illusions were held about Communist 
intentions; it was deemed to be in Britain’s best interest that the Eastern European 
Social Democrats resisted the further communisation of their countries.
Secondly, the Eastern European Social Democratic parties were to be offered 
material encouragement. This kind of encouragement was above all intended to 
strengthen the position of these parties, or their leading personalities, within their 
respective countries. Various schemes to provide Eastern European countries with 
financial aid, backing in international organisations or support in frontier disputes 
were drawn up within the Labour Party. Yet, the Foreign Office was often unwill- 
ing to Supplement moral encouragement with material encouragement. Of course, 
during the first post-war years, Britain, only just recovering from its own bankrupt- 
cy, had little economic leverage. In most cases, however, the designs anticipated 
spending not British, but American funds on the Eastern European countries. 
Therefore, the fact that Foreign Office personnel held no high esteem for most 
Eastern European Social Democrats seems to háve played a considerable role in their 
reluctance. The decision to bestow British support upon the Government Social 
Democratic parties in Eastern Europe was always a half-hearted one. For example, 
when new deliberations between the Foreign Office and the State Department on the 
issue of extending a further American credit to the Hungarian Government were 
prepared in April 1947, a leading diplomat doubted whether “the near-Communists 
of Mr. Szakasits” were indeed “the best bet”. When Foreign Office officials were 
enthusiastic about bold schemes to prop up the Eastern European Social Democrats, 
they stumbled upon a reluctant Foreign Minister. The “Mayhew Plan”, set to in- 
crease the populär appeal of the Eastern European Social Democratic parties via 
a propaganda campaign, was sacrificed on the altar of non-interference by Bevin. In 
the face of blatant American and Soviet support for affable political currents across 
the continent, it was a missed chance indeed.100
This was all the more so as the politics of appeasement seemed to be bearing fruits. 
When the merger of Communists and Socialists in Poland was announced in March
99 FO 371/67173 R5129, NA, London.
100 The American State Department even went as far as giving outright financial support to the 
Italian Workers’ Socialist Party (PSLI), the anti-Communist grouping led by Giuseppe 
Saragat which broke away from the pro-Communist Italian Socialist Party in January 1947. 
See: Sassoon, Donald: One Hundred Years of Socialism. The West European Left in the 
Twentieth Century. London, New York 1996, 135.
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1948, it was intended to materialise in the summer. In fact, Opposition to fusion was 
so vast within the PPS that it took a full nine months before the inner-party purge 
was completed, suggesting that the consolidation of the party had indeed progressed 
to a considerable extern during the period of appeasement.101 On top of that, the pol- 
itics of appeasement even appear to have left room for influencing long-term soci- 
etal developments. Speaking on the Polish Three Year Plan at the Wroclaw congress 
of the PPS, Adam Rapacki, the economic specialist of the Polish Socialists, argued 
that both the PPS and the PPR made “unique and complementary contributions” to 
the plan - the Communists “providing the revolutionary élan”, the Socialists “pro- 
viding the humanism and regard for the individual”.102 Socialist humanitarianism 
might then have contributed to the fact that Poland was the sole state in the Soviet 
Union’s sphere of influence never to become totalitarian.103
101 The Fusion of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). In: LPA, LP/ID, Box 13, LHASC, 
Manchester.
102 LPA, LP/ID, Box 13, LHASC, Manchester.
103 According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepán “a significant de facto degree of societal plu- 
ralism” survived in post-1948 Poland, thereby not corresponding to the typology of a total-
itarian state. See: Linz, Juan ]./Stepán, Alfred: Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation. Southern-Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Balti-
more 1996, 255-261.
